Shavuos 28
Our Gemara on amud aleph discusses when the punishment of lashes begins, which has implications for whether an interruption means it is considered sufficiently administered. This has further implications, such as the principle that a vow cannot be annulled if it is no longer relevant. If a person is still awaiting the administration of lashes or is even potentially liable for conviction, the oath remains relevant and can still be annulled. Regarding this, Shmuel rules:
If one had already been tied to the stake to receive lashes and he ran away from the court and escaped, he is exempt from receiving lashes, as being tied to the stake is regarded as the beginning of receiving the lashes; once he has escaped, he is treated as though he were already flogged.
However, the Gemara limits this escape clause:
Even if he was tied to the stake, he can still have his oath dissolved. There, with regard to his exemption from receiving lashes after he ran away, the original flogging is over, and there is no need to initiate a new one. Here, with regard to dissolving the oath, he did not run, and since he is still subject to lashes, he can still have his oath dissolved.
Rashi explains that a certain threshold of humiliation occurs through the process of flogging, and that threshold is sufficiently reached if he runs away or if he ultimately endures the flogging. If he is tied up and about to receive the flogging, then although humiliating, that is not sufficient, and therefore the punishment has not yet been administered. It is apparent from Rashi’s understanding that there is a particular mortification the person undergoes when he runs away. It seems to me we’re talking about the loss of dignity and the cowardice he displays publicly.
This is not merely a vain instinct to appear tough and macho, but a legitimate Torah ethic to remain dignified and composed, even in the most extreme circumstances. Gemara Sanhedrin (92b) praises Chananiah, Mishael, and Azarya, who chose to be thrown into the furnace rather than bow to Nebuchadnezzar’s idol. The Gemara notes a specific aspect of their demeanor:
Even during a period of danger, a person should not change his projection of leadership and demean himself, as it is stated: “Then these men were bound in their mantles, their tunics, and their hats, and their other garments, and they were cast into the blazing fiery furnace” (Daniel 3:21). Even when cast into the furnace, they donned garments befitting their noble status.
We see that it is a Torah value to maintain composure, even under the most dire circumstances. When we look at the commentaries, we see different ideas as to why this is so, each reflecting on the human condition. Rashi says that remaining calm rattles and humiliates the enemy. I imagine Rashi suggesting a Gandhi-style passive resistance that frustrates and humiliates the enemy despite their physical power and aggression. Maharsha adds a moral-religious theme, stating that maintaining calm and composure indicates one is accepting G-d and His punishment. Meiri speaks from a psychological perspective, stressing the basic value of maintaining self-control and focus, even under enormous stress, which is intrinsically empowering and dignified. The Ohr Tzafun (Bereishis, Derech Eretz Kadmah LaTorah) expands on this theme dramatically, even drawing from Midrashim that criticize Esav for mildly losing composure during a frustrating hunting expedition on the day of his father’s death. He maintains that the ethic of “not losing oneself” and one’s self-control is so basic and self-evident that it is even considered an obligation for all peoples of the world, not just under the Jewish covenant and 613 mitzvos.
The secular version of the Holocaust narrative is that the majority of Jews went peaceably and passively to their slaughter, with a smaller group of occasional “heroes” who fought back. I have no problem with the narrative that those who fought back were heroes; we have enough models in our own Jewish history for the value of military rebellion and self-defense, such as the Maccabees and the Bar Kochba rebellion, though the Sages were often ambivalent about such actions (as recorded in Maccabim 2:29-41). However, secular and Western attitudes have not given enough credence to the heroes who died quietly and passively. While on the outside, it might appear as if they had given up or retreated into a catatonic state, in fact, this was their final act of defiance. Even as their enemies sought to rob them of all aspects of human dignity, they refused to lose themselves, and contemplated and prepared to meet their Maker. They were more alive and more human than their diabolical tormentors. Although most of the great and pious Jews who met their death never read Socrates, his final speech to his executioners comes to mind:
I leave you now, condemned to death by you, but you are condemned by truth to wickedness and injustice.
Good Reasons for Bad Behavior
Shavuos 30
Our Gemara on amud aleph discusses the responsibilities of judges in a court of law to ensure justice, sometimes even noticing subtle ways someone might feel intimidated and unable to fully defend or express themselves. However, our Sages extend the biblical directive to judge righteously (Vayikra 19:15), “B’tzedek tishpot es amisecha,” to include making efforts to think favorably of others within the courtroom of our minds.
Ben Yehoyada states that this application to judge someone favorably and give others the benefit of the doubt applies even when there is a preponderance of evidence suggesting something nefarious. We should look for any possible justification for their behavior. He cleverly sees this hinted in the Hebrew “B’tzedek” – the Hebrew letters for “B-Z-K” are also an acronym for “be-tzaad kuf,” on the side of the letter kuf. What do we find on the side of the letter kuf? The letters tzadei and reish, which spell “tzar,” meaning narrow. That is to say, even if there is only a narrow margin of possibility to explain and justify this person’s behavior, we are obligated to do so socially. (This is not related to monetary matters, nor – when it will be received properly – to rebuke a wrongdoer.)
We must ask ourselves what purpose and morality this excessive requirement serves. Why should we naïvely force ourselves to believe strenuous justifications for other people’s malfeasance? Of course, we should avoid quarrels unless absolutely necessary, but isn’t it distorting to try to tell ourselves something that is most likely false?
The Shalah (Shaar HaOsiyos, Kaf Zechus) explains this theurgically: How we behave in this world creates correspondence in the upper world. Therefore, when we choose to judge others favorably, we induce favorable judgment upon ourselves. This is an important point and explains a great potential benefit of this attitude, but we still must understand, on a practical level, how it is healthy or moral to pretend and look for good reasons for bad behavior. (Incidentally, this has its limits; for a person who is consistently unabashedly evil, we have no such obligation. (ibid.).)
Likkutei Moharan (Tinyana 1:14) suggests a mystical-psychological explanation. Strife and quarrel ultimately stem from difference. If one is in conflict with another person, strenuously trying to understand justification for their point of view closes the gap between the two people and reduces the conflict. He then adds an interesting point, referencing a verse in Mishlei (25:21-22) that seems to express the concept of “killing them with kindness”:
If your enemy is hungry, give him bread to eat; if he is thirsty, give him water to drink. You will be heaping live coals on his head, and the L-rd will reward you.
The consensus from the commentaries is that Solomon advises responding to an enemy with kindness, so as to cause guilt and frustration, disarming them and eventually leading to self-reflection. Similarly, Likkutei Moharan suggests that judging a person favorably, even against all apparent indications, accomplishes one of two things. Perhaps you think you are right, but the conflict arises because you and this other person are not in the same place or situation, psychologically or emotionally. By trying to understand some justification for their behavior, it brings you closer to them, reducing or sometimes eliminating the conflict. On the other hand, if the other person is truly a bad actor and the malfeasance is not a perception but closer to reality, by verbalizing and acting as if there ought to be justification and good intentions for this behavior, the other person is often humbled and forced to self-reflect.
A word of caution: Any advice from Chazal is no different from medicine. Medicine statistically helps, but not in every situation, and sometimes, quite to the contrary, it can cause more problems. These kinds of stances can work with someone who has blind spots or character flaws but, in totality, has basic decency and a sense of fairness and perspective. If one is dealing with a personality that is highly narcissistic or consistently abusive, these tactics may not work.
Of historical significance, I quote from Gandhi’s letter to Hitler (may his name be erased) in 1940, where he refers to him as a “friend” and tries desperately to validate some admirable quality without flattering him for his despotic actions:
December 24, 1940
DEAR FRIEND,
That I address you as a friend is no formality. I own no foes. My business in life has been for the past 33 years to enlist the friendship of the whole of humanity by befriending mankind, irrespective of race, colour, or creed. I hope you will have the time and desire to know how a good portion of humanity who have been living under the influence of that doctrine of universal friendship view your action. We have no doubt about your bravery or devotion to your fatherland, nor do we believe that you are the monster described by your opponents. But your own writings and pronouncements and those of your friends and admirers leave no room for doubt that many of your acts are monstrous and unbecoming of human dignity, especially in the estimation of men like me who believe in universal friendliness. Such are your humiliation of Czechoslovakia, the rape of Poland, and the swallowing of Denmark. I am aware that your view of life regards such spoliations as virtuous acts. But we have been taught from childhood to regard them as acts degrading humanity. Hence we cannot possibly wish success to your arms. (Source: https://time.com/5685122/gandhi-hitler-letter/)
We know that history judges the approach of passive resistance as not always successful when dealing with abject evil. As many lives as it cost, it was necessary for the United States to enter World War II and join the Allies in annihilating evil. Perhaps today, we must also take such an approach with violent Islamic regimes that threaten the existence of the entire civilized world.
